In the civil system, the concept of intent to create legal relations is closely linked to the “theory of the will” of contracts, as developed by the German jurist Friedrich Carl von Savigny during the 19th century.  In the 19th century, the fact that contracts were based on a meeting of minds between two or more parties and that their mutual agreement on an agreement or their intention to enter into contracts was of the utmost importance. While it is generally true that the courts want to resist the intentions of the parties, the courts in the second half of the 19th century moved to a more objective interpretation, with an emphasis on how the parties agreed with the outside world. In the face of this amendment, it has always been said that “the intention to be legally bound” is a necessary element of a treaty, but there has been a policy on when and when agreements should be implemented. Although conjecture is no longer used, in reality, in most national or social agreements, the parties generally do not intend to forge legal ties, at least if the agreement is reached when relations are harmonious. As a result, an applicant is likely to face an increasing struggle that proves his intent in such cases. Where an agreement is a trade agreement, the parties generally intend to make it legally binding. In such a case, it will be difficult to show anything else. Again, the intent review is objective.
If the parties to a trade agreement do not provide for it to be binding, they can use so-called “honour clauses” to emphasize that the agreement is binding only in its honour, not in law. In what kind of agreement is the intention to establish legal relations presumed to exist? The doctrine determines whether a court should consider that the parties want the agreement to be enforceable by law, and it is established that an agreement is legally enforceable only if the parties believe that it intends to enter into a binding contract. In Simpkins v Pays, an informal agreement between a grandmother, granddaughter and tenant on the sharing of the benefits of competition was binding. Sellers J noted, in applying the objective test, that the facts were “reciprocal” between the parties, adding that there is no presumption for social agreements and that the case is decided only in its merits. “Any collective agreement concluded after the beginning of this section must clearly be considered not to have been defined by the parties as a legally enforceable contract, unless it is an agreement: is an agreement concluded in a social or domestic context, what is the general rule of intent to establish legal relations? Commercial transactions confirm a strong presumption of a valid contract: these agreements, in which the parties act as if they were foreigners, are considered binding. However, the “honour clauses” in the “gentlemen`s agreements” are recognized as an honest intention to create legal relations, as in the Jones/Vernons pools (where the clause “This agreement is binding only in honour” was effective). You have to be careful not to be able to write a clause to try to exclude the jurisdiction of a court, because the clause is null and void, as in Baker/Jones.  If a contract has both an “honour clause” and a clause that attempts to exclude the jurisdiction of a court (as in Rose – Frank v Crompton) , the court may apply the blue pencil rule that excludes the insulting party. The court will then recognize the rest, if it still makes sense, and will remain in agreement with the parties` negotiations. The insulting clause was that although many sources consider “social and domestic agreements” to be a single class, it is preferable to regard “family agreements” as a separate class from “social conventions” because it does not make a presumption, and only the objective test applies.